Abstract. We propose an improved preimage attack on one-block MD4 with the time complexity 2 94.98 MD4 compression function operations, as compared to 2 107 in [3] . We research the attack procedure in [3] and formulate the complexity for computing a preimage attack on one-block MD4. We attain the result mainly through the following two aspects with the help of the complexity formula. First, we continue to compute two more steps backward to get two more chaining values for comparison during the meet-in-the-middle attack. Second, we search two more neutral words in one independent chunk, and then propose the multineutral-word partial-fixing technique to get more message freedom and skip ten steps for partial-fixing, as compared to previous four steps. We also use the initial structure technique and apply the same idea to improve the pseudo-preimage and preimage attacks on Extended MD4 with 2 25.2 and 2 12.6 improvement factor, as compared to previous attacks in [20] , respectively.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function takes an input message m of arbitrary length and produces an output h of fixed length, i.e., h = HASH(m). Cryptographic hash functions have many important applications, such as digital signatures, message authentication codes, and random number generators. A cryptographic hash function should have the following three properties.
-Preimage resistance: given a hash value h, it is hard to find a message m so that h = HASH(m). -Second preimage resistance: given a message m 1 , it is hard to find another message m 2 and m 2 = m 1 so that HASH(m 2 ) = HASH(m 1 ). -Collision resistance: it is hard to find two messages m 1 and m 2 (m 1 = m 2 ) so that HASH(m 1 ) = HASH(m 2 ).
MD4, which was introduced by Rivest in 1990 [17] , is a cryptographic hash function. Its design goals are security, speed, simplicity and compactness, and favoring little-endian architectures, respectively. The design philosophy of the most used cryptographic hash function, such as MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2, even many of SHA-3 candidates, is original from MD4. Though the collision resistance of MD4 was broken in 1996 [9] , MD4 has still been applied in many aspects because of its preimage resistance and speed. First, MD4 is used in ed2k URI scheme and it provides a unique identifier for a file in the popular eDonkey2000 /eMule P2P networks. Second, MD4 is also used in the rsync protocol. Third, MD4 is used in NT LAN Manager version one mainly employed in early versions of Windows NT. Fourth, MD4 is used in the S/KEY one-Time Password System.
Related Works
We mainly introduce collision attacks on MD4 and preimage attacks on MD4-family here. Merkle showed an unpublished collision attack on the first two rounds of MD4. Den Boer et al. presented a collision attack on the last two rounds of MD4 [8] . Vaudenay et al. also showed a collision attack on the first two rounds of MD4 [22] . The first collision attack on the full rounds of MD4 was presented by Dobbertin in 1996, as well as a collision of the slightly modified variant of Extended MD4, where both lines have the same initial state [9] . The very efficient collision attack on MD4 was published using the innovative method by Wang et al. in Eurocrypt 2005 [24] . Sasaki et al. improved the collision attack on MD4 using the different message difference in FSE 2007 [21] . Yu and Wang presented a new type multi-collision attack on the compression function of MD4 in ICISC 2007 [26] .
The result that the first two rounds of MD4 is not one way was proposed by Dobbertin in FSE 1998 [10] . Kuwakado and Tanaka proposed a method to find preimage on reduced MD4 which only consists of the first and third rounds in 1999 [13] . Yu et al. presented a kind of second-preimage attack on MD4 in CANS 2005 [25] . But it is effective only for very long messages with low complexity. De et al. showed a preimage attack on 2 rounds and 7 steps of MD4 using SAT solvers [6] . The first preimage attack on the full MD4 was proposed by Leurent in FSE 2008 [15] . Its pseudo-preimage and preimage are with complexity of 2 96 and 2 100.5 , respectively. In SAC 2008, Aoki and Sasaki presented preimage attacks on one-block MD4 with the complexity of 2 107 and 63-step MD5 [3] . In SAC 2008, Aumasson et al. showed a preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL [4] . In CRYPTO 2008, Cannière and Rechberger presented preimage attacks on 49 steps of SHA-0 and 44 steps of SHA-1 [7] . Wang words. Both of their second preimage length is equal or greater than 3 blocks. We research the preimage attack procedure on one-block MD4 in [3] , analyze in detail how the attack complexity is acquired, and formulate the complexity for computing a preimage attack on one-block MD4, and then get an observation that we can continue to compute two more steps during backward computation to get two more chaining values used for partial-matching additionally. This can improve the complexity with 2 3.5 factor, as compared to the original one in [3] . We find two more new neutral words additionally in the second message chunk. In order to utilize the new neutral words, we propose the multi-neutralword partial-fixing technique. This can skip ten steps during the partial-matching and get more message freedom used for the meet-in-the-middle attack. The improvement by the method predominates in our results.
Our Results
We apply the partial-matching and indirect partial-matching techniques simultaneously to match the chaining values during the meet-in-the-middle attack. This slightly improves the complexity with less than 2 1 factor. We improve the preimage attack on one-block MD4 with the complexity 2 94.98 using the above three methods. We use the initial structure technique to get one more neutral word and apply the same idea to improve the preimage attack on Extended MD4 in [20] . This can get the improvement with 2 25.2 and 2 12.6 factor, as compared to the previous pseudo-preimage and preimage attacks on Extended MD4 in [20] , respectively. Meanwhile, we provide a corrected version of the swapping function of the compression function of Extended MD4 in [20] . A summary of our results and previously published results is provided in Table 1 .
Specification of MD4 and Extended MD4
2.1 Specification of MD4 The MD4 algorithm takes an input message whose length can be arbitrary and produces an output 128-bit hash value. First of all, the input message is padded, i.e., the message is appended a single 1 and some 0 so that the length of the padded message becomes congruent to 448, modulo 512. Then, the length of the original message before the padded bits were added is appended to the already padded message. The MD4 algorithm uses the Merkle-Damgård iterated structure [5, 16] . The compression function of MD4 has three rounds and every round has 16 steps. Every step uses equation (1) to update the chaining variable. π(j) is a function of MD4 message expansion. φ j , s j , and k j are bitwise Boolean function, const value, and left rotation, respectively. Equation (2) is contrary for equation (1) . π(j) and φ j are shown in Table 2 . s j and k j are shown in Table 3 . IV is the initial value defined in the specification. Equation (3) represents a run procedure of compression function of MD4. R j is the state update function of MD4 as shown in Fig.1 . Here, p j is an internal state and 8, 4, 12, 2, 10, 6, 14, 1, 9, 5, 13, 3, 11, 7, 15 X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z Table 3 . Number of rotation and Magic constants of MD4 15 3,7,11,19,3,7,11,19,3,7,11,19,3,7,11,19 K0 = 0 16 17· · · 31 3,5,9,13,3,5,9,13,3,5,9,13,3,5,9,13 K1 = 0x5a827999 32 33· · · 473,9,11,15,3,9,11,15,3,9,11,15,3,9,11,15K2 = 0x6ed9eba1
Specification of Extended MD4
Rivest also proposed an extension version of MD4 with 256-bit hash values, which is called Extended MD4 in [9] , in order to satisfy higher security [17] . The compression function of Extended MD4 is made up of two copies of compress function of MD4 running in parallel. The first copy is the standard compression function of MD4. The second copy differs only on the initial state and the magic constants.
The initial state of the second copy is:
The magic constants of the second copy is:
The values of the A registers in the two copies are exchanged at the end of the compression function. The final hash value is produced by concatenating the results of the two copies. In order to explain the above exchange process, we suppose that the output value of left copy of the compression function of
) and the output value of right copy is ( 
In [20] , the description about the exchange process in the two copies of the compression function of Extended MD4, that the values of Q 16 , Q 32 and Q 48 in the two copies are exchanged, does not correspond to the one in [17] . But this hardly influence the complexity.
The swapping function of the compression function of Extended MD4, which is used for interaction between two copies, is different from those of RIPEMD-256 and RIPEMD-320.
Related Techniques
Here, we introduce some related techniques.
Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
The meet-in-the-middle attack is a type of birthday attack and makes use of a space-time tradeoff. The unbalanced meet-in-the-middle attack was proposed first in [14] . The compression function computes forward to the given step and gets a set of results, and then the compression function computes backward and gets another set of results. The two sets of results are compared to search a intersection. The two computation procedures must be independent on each other so that the birthday attack rule can be applied.
Converting Pseudo-Preimage Attack into Preimage Attack
The method of converting a pseudo-preimage attack into a preimage attack was proposed first in [14] . Because the initial chaining value of pseudo-preimage is not the fixed IV, we hash a message block for connecting the fixed IV with the initial chaining value. Searching the proper message block accords with the birthday attack rule. If it takes 2 k complexity to produce a pseudo-preimage in a n-bit iterated hash function, then the total complexity to produce a preimage is 2
Splice-and-Cut Technique
The splice-and-cut technique is proposed first in [3] . During a preimage attack, the hash value is given, and thus it is a constant. Therefore, the final output state subtracted from the hash value is the initial internal state in the Davies-Meyer mode. Thus we can regard the first and last steps as consecutive steps, and then any step can be considered a starting step in the meet-in-the-middle attack.
Initial Structure Technique
The initial structure technique was proposed first in [19] . The neutral words for the two message chunks may mix in the beginning of the attack point so as to be difficult to find two independent message chunks during the meet-in-the-middle attack. This technique is used to solve the problem and helps to search better two independent message chunks for a more successful meet-in-the-middle attack.
Partial-Matching, Partial-Fixing and Indirect-Partial-Matching Techniques
The partial-matching and partial-fixing techniques are also presented first in [3] . The state update function does not update all of chaining variables of an internal state. The partial-matching technique makes use of the property so that several steps between two independent message chunks can be skipped.
If we can fix some bits of a neutral word in order to be able to continue to compute, such technique is called the partial-fixing technique. The partial-fixing technique is the partial-matching technique in nature.
The indirect-partial-matching technique, which is proposed first in [1] , is an extension of the partial-matching technique. If the computation of a matching point can be decomposed the independent computation of the functions of the neutral words, the indirect-partial-matching technique can be applied. Table 4 . Message word distribution for one-block MD4 in [3] Step 0 
How to Improve the Preimage Attack on One-block MD4
The message word distribution for one-block MD4 in [3] is shown in Table 4 . In Table 4 , the neutral word for the first chunk is m 8 ( 
The computation in the right side of equation (5) 
Proof. According to the procedure in the meet-in-the-middle attack, we know the first attack procedure is made up of the computation of the first chunk (i.e. backward computation), the computation of the second chunk (i.e. forward computation), and the computation of the matching procedure. If any four successive chaining variables (Q i , Q i+1 , Q i+2 , Q i+3 ) are matched entirety, the meet-in-the-middle attack succeeds, otherwise, it fails and needs to repeat the attack procedure. Furthermore, if the quantity of 2
48 , compared to the complexity of other steps, is negligible, the quantity is not needed to add to the time complexity. Therefore, the time complexity of the first attack procedure (before repeated) is shown by equation (5) . The attack is statistical. Because the number of the bits of the chaining variables (
is 128, and the number of total free bits is f , the first attack procedure needs to repeat 2 128−f times. Thus the total time complexity to produce a preimage for one-block MD4 is shown by equation (6) .
We should make −f + r as little as possible according to Proposition 2, moreover we can compute the optimal complexity by the program, as shown in Appendix A, according to Proposition 2.
We explain how to improve the complexity through the following three ways. The following three ways can be used independently, and also be combined to improve the complexity.
Improvement One
According to Proposition 1, we can try to store the partial values of (Q 25 , Q 26 , Q 27 , Q 28 ) for comparing, instead of those of (Q 27 , Q 28 ), in order to improve the complexity. There is a statement in [3] , that "In MD4, up to four steps can be additionally skipped by the partial-fixing technique ". But we discover that six steps can be additionally skipped by the partial-fixing technique, i.e., we can compute the partial values of Q 30 , Q 29 , Q 28 , Q 27 , Q 26 and Q 25 using the partial value of m 8 by the partial-fixing technique. In [3] , they only compute the partial values of Q 30 , Q 29 , Q 28 and Q 27 using the partial value of m 8 . We conjecture that the reason why the partial values of Q 26 and Q 25 are not continued to compute in [3] is that the neutral word m 7 is met when Q 26 is computed. Though m 7 is a neutral word for the second chunk, the value of m 7 is known during the backward computation, so we can still compute Q 26 using m 7 . We combine the above observation with the idea from Proposition 2 to improve the complexity. We compute forward using all possible values of m 8 (thereinto, 
Improvement Two
We know that the neutral word m 7 for the second chunk has 32 free bits, while the neutral word m 8 for the first chunk only has 24 free bits, in Table 4 . The number of free bits of m 8 , which is less than that of m 7 , is a big bottleneck for improve the complexity according to Proposition 2. We should manage to increase the number of the free bits of the neutral words for the first chunk according to Proposition 2 if we want to improve the complexity about preimage attack on one-block MD4 further. Based on the above idea, we try to search new neutral words for the first chunk. There are only six message words, i.e., (m 3 , m 7 , m 11 , m 15 , m 0 , m 8 ), in the skip interval in Table 4 , where m 3 , m 7 and m 8 have been used as neutral words. Thus, we test other message words, i.e., (m 11 , m 15 , m 0 ), and find they can not be used as neutral words. Therefore, we have no choice but to extend the skip interval. We add m 4 , which is next to m 8 in the third round, to the skip interval. Then we test m 4 , and find that it cannot be used as a neutral word for the first chunk. Anyway, we continue to test m 12 , which is next two steps to m 8 in the third round. Luckily, m 12 can be used as a neutral word for the first chunk. But we meet another problem that m 12 is next two steps to m 8 in the third round, and how do we overcome the two steps? We try to use the partial-fixing technique to deal with it, i.e., some bits of m 12 are fixed and the other bits of m 12 are used as free bits so that we can continue to compute backward with the fixed bits of m 12 and get the free bits of m 12 for improving the meet-in-the-middle attack. As a result, it is feasible. In the same way, m 10 can also be used as a neutral word for the first chunk. Therefore, the sum of the free bits which m 8 , m 12 and m 10 can provide is much more than the one which m 8 can do. Because m 8 , m 12 and m 10 are used as neutral words for the first chunk, moreover, all of them are used by the partial-fixing. We call the technique multi-neutral-word partial-fixing. The multi-neutral-word partialfixing technique is a variation of the partial-fixing technique, where multiple neutral words in one message chunk are partially fixed to skip more steps for the matching-part in the meet-in-the-middle attack and get more message free bits to improve the meet-in-the-middle attack. We can additionally skip ten steps for the matching-part for the preimage attack on one-block MD4 (even eleven steps for the matching-part for the preimage attack on Extended MD4) using the multi-neutral-word partial-fixing technique, instead of four steps claimed in [3] . We may find more neutral words and better message chunks using the multineutral-word partial-fixing technique. These results are shown in Tables 5 and  6 .
Improvement Three
We apply the partial-matching and indirect-partial-matching techniques simultaneously to compare the chaining variables during the meet-in-the-middle attack. Though this can only slightly improve the complexity, we first show that the two techniques can be applied simultaneously.
We cannot compute Q 29 during the forward computation according to equation (7) The following equation (8) is from Step 4i in Section 5.1. Q 25 are known). The other is that we can take less cost as X is computed and compared more earlier than Q 25 during the backward computation.
Preimage Attack on One-block MD4

Attack Procedure of One-block MD4
Assume that the given hash value is H. 35 × 7 words, i.e., the one in Step 3c. The program codes, which are used to compute the optimal complexity of preimage on one-block MD4, are in Appendix A.
Set p
48 = H − IV (p 0 ). Set C 1 , C 2 ,= (C 4 ≫ s 0 ) − Q −3 − φ 0 (Q 0 , Q −1 , Q −2 ) (b) m 1 = (C 3 ≫ s 1 ) − Q −2 − φ 1 (C 4 , Q 0 , Q −1 ) (c) m 2 = (C 3 ≫ s 2 ) − Q −1 − φ 2 (C 3 , C 4 , Q 0 ) (d) m 4 = (0 ≫ s 4 ) − C 4 − C 3 (e) m 5 = 1 − C 3 − C 3 = 1 − 2C 3 (f) m 6 = (C 2 ≫ s 6 ) − C 3) p j+1 = R j (p j , m π(j) ), for j = 8, 9, ..., 27. (b) Let X = Q 25 + φ 28 (Q 28 , Q 27 , Q 26 ) + t 2 (Note Q 29 = (X + m 3 ) ≪ 3) (c* = (C 1 ≫ s 7 ) − φ 7 (C 2 , 1, 0) − m 7 (b) m 3 = ( * ≫ s 3 ) − Q 0 − φ 3 (C 3 , C 3 , C 4 ) (c) p j = R −1 j (p j+1 , m π(j) ), for j = 46, 45, ..., 38. (d) 22−0 Q 34 = ( all Q 38 ≫ 9) − φ 37 ( all Q 37 , all Q 36 , all Q 35 ) −Q 30 ) − all m 0 − all t 3 (j) 10−0 X = ( 13−0 Q 29 ≫ 3) − all m 3 (k) 9−0 Q 28 = ( 22−0 Q 32 ≫ 13) − φ 31 ( 22−0 Q 31 , 13−0 Q 30 , 13−0 Q 29 ) − all m 15 − all t 2 (l) 9−0 Q 27 = ( 22−0 Q 31 ≫ 9) − φ 30 ( 13−0 Q 30 , 13−0 Q 29 , 9−0 Q 28 ) − all m 11 − all t 2 (m) 8−0 Q 26 = ( 13−0 Q 30 ≫ 5) − φ 29 ( 13−0 Q 29 , 9−0 Q 28 , 9−0 Q 27 ) − all m 7 − all t 2 (n) Compare ( 8−0 Q 26 , 9−0 Q 27 , 9−0 Q 28 , 10−0 X ) with ( all Q 26 , all Q 27 , all Q 28 , all X) in the
Preimage Attack on Extended MD4
We still use the message word distribution shown in Table 5 as the one for preimage on two-block Extended MD4. In order to facilitate comparison, we also display the message word distribution shown in Table 7 , which is used for both preimage attack on two-block Extended MD4 in [20] and preimage attack on two-block MD4 in [3] .
For the preimage attack on two-block Extended MD4, we use the message words (m 3 , m 7 ) as the neutral words for the second chunk and (m 8 , m 10 , m 12 ) as the neutral words for the first chunk, while the neutral word for the second chunk is m 7 and the neutral word for the first chunk is m 8 in [20] .
We continue to analyze the message word distribution in Table 5 in order to improve the complexity further. We check if it is possible to put m 6 in round 3 into the skip interval and make it be a neutral word for the first chunk. However, m 6 in round 1 is in the first chunk. If we would regard m 6 as a neutral word for Table 6 . Our Message word distribution for two-block Extended MD4
Step 0 1 2 Table 7 . Message word distribution for two-block Extended MD4 in [20] Step 0 the first chunk, we must try to put m 6 in round 1 into the second chunk. We find that m 6 in round 1 is next to m 7 , which is a neutral word for the second chunk. Hence, we can move the splitting point one step leftward and apply a 2-step initial structure to m 6 and m 7 in round 1, as shown in Fig. 2 , and then m 6 is changed with m 7 in round 1 so that m 6 can be a neutral word for the first chunk, and m 7 remains unchanged and is still a neutral word for the second chunk, as shown in Table 6 . Our preimage attack procedure on Extended MD4 is similar to that on one-block MD4. The interaction between the copies of Extended MD4 is simple and easy to deal with according to the description in Section 2.2. Finally, we improve the results about the pseudo-preimage and preimage attacks on Extended MD4 at the complexity 2 203.8 and 2 230.9 , respectively. The detailed attack procedure is presented in next section.
Attack Procedure of Extended MD4
Assume that the given hash value is H, and H exchange is the value of H exchanged, after the values of the A registers in the two copies are exchanged according to Section 2.2. 
+1
) CF. The memory requirements are 2 52 × 12 words, i.e., the one in Step 2e. The program codes for computing the optimal complexity of preimage attack on Extended MD4 are in Appendix B.
Conclusion
This paper shows the improved preimage attacks on one-block MD4 and twoblock Extended MD4. We think that the idea used in the paper can be tried to improve the preimage attacks on other hash functions in the MD4-family. 
